Antitrust Implications of Medical Peer Review: Balancing the Competing Interests by Ruane, Joan M.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 5
12-15-1987
Antitrust Implications of Medical Peer Review:
Balancing the Competing Interests
Joan M. Ruane
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the
Organizations Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joan M. Ruane Antitrust Implications of Medical Peer Review: Balancing the Competing Interests , 15 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1988)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol15/iss1/5
Antitrust Implications of Medical Peer Review:
Balancing the Competing Interests
One of the greatest difficulties facing hospital-medical staff members today is
the requirement of service on various hospital peer review committees. As a
result, staff members must review the competency of fellow staff members.
When faced with the prospect of "blowing the whistle" on colleagues, physi-
cians are confronted with an array of potential legal actions that a disgrun-
tled reviewee may assert. Most fearsome to the reviewing physician is the
prospect of a federal antitrust suit with its attending treble damages award.
In the past several years, both Congress and the federal courts have stepped up
their efforts to assure physicians that their peer review activities, which are
vital to safeguard the public against incompetent physicians, will be given the
utmost protection. Recently, in a landmark decision, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals announced for the first time that peer review activities, whether or
not conducted in bad faith, are immune from federal antitrust scrutiny.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era of rising health-care costs,1 the demand for physician par-
ticipation on peer review committees 2 has never been greater. Grow-
ing concern over the quality of medical care has sparked the
development of mandatory quality assurance programs 3 throughout
the health care industry. Unfortunately, the duty to participate in
peer review4 has also spawned a number of lawsuits5 brought by phy-
1. USA Today, Feb. 16, 1987, at 10A, col. 1. (Doctors' fees, hospital bills, and pre-
scription drugs rose 7.7% in 1986, meaning that the nation's medical bills rose seven
times faster than the cost of all U.S. production in 1986). See also Lamm, America's
Inefficient Health Care: One Possible Cure Could Be Rationing, L.A. Times, Feb. 1,
1987, § 5 (Opinion), at 1.
2. Peer review can be defined as "the evaluation by practicing physicians of the
quality, efficiency and effectiveness of services ordered or performed by other physi-
cians." W. ISELE, THE HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF: ITS LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES 126 (1984). Peer review encompasses all medical review efforts, including
utilization review, medical audit, the credential awarding function, periodic reappoint-
ment evaluations, and quality review activities. Id.
3. Lembcke, Evolution of the Medical Audit, 199 J. A.M.A. 543 (1967) (Formal
peer review dates back to the early 20th century, when medicine was becoming an in-
creasingly scientific discipline. The professional conscience was aroused by studies
that found that most institutions were unable to meet any reasonable standard of
care). See also Payne, Continued Evolution of a System Medical Care Appraisal, 201 J.
A.M.A. 536 (1967).
4. Mandatory peer review is a prerequisite when professional services are paid
for with public funds. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c) (1983 & Supp. III 1986). More recently, peer
review has been required for professional health services paid for with federal funds
under the Professional Standards Review Organization. Peer review was formerly re-
quired under the Medicaid and Maternal Child Health and Crippled Children's service
sicians against peer review committee members who have reviewed
them, and recommended that their privileges be terminated or sus-
pended. For the most part, the decisions are inconsistent as to
whether a cause of action should be recognized. 6
The difficulty with a courts' failure to recognize antitrust claims 7
under these circumstances, is that some physicians are subjected to
peer review conducted in bad faith.8 Even though all the elements
necessary to assert a legitimate antitrust claim may be present, physi-
cians have been unable to succeed in both state9 and federal court
actions.10
This comment will discuss the case law surrounding the peer re-
view process and provide an overview of the applicable antitrust pro-
visions. Finally, the comment will conclude that the public's interest
programs (Titles XIX and V of the Social Security Act). These requirements were
amended in 1981, making such review optional among the states. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2111-2113, 95 Stat. 357, 794-96 (1981)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(c), 1396(a), 1396(b) (1983)).
5. Most of these suits allege defamation of character, tortious interference with
business relations, violation of due process, and/or antitrust violations. See Wright v.
Southern Mono Hosp. Dist., 631 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (antitrust claim denied);
Ascherman v. Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1972) (defamation
claim denied); Good Samaritan Hosp. Ass'n v. Simon, 370 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (defamation claim permitted); Maimon v. Sisters of the Third Order of St.
Francis, 142 Ill. App. 3d 306, 491 N.E.2d 779 (1986) (libel claim denied); Matviuw v.
Johnson and Alexian Bros. Med. Center, 70 Ill. App. 3d 481, 388 N.E.2d 795 (1979) (def-
amation claim permitted); Hayden v. Foryt, 407 So. 2d 535 (Miss. 1981) (reh'g denied)
(slander claim permitted).
6. See cases cited supra note 5.
7. The statute commonly used in antitrust actions is the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1983 & Supp. III 1986). However, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1983 &
Supp. III 1986), the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-48 (1983 & Supp.
III 1986), and state antitrust laws may also apply.
8. Common to most state immunity statutes is the requirement that communica-
tions made to peer review committees be conducted in "good faith." Typical is the
Maryland statute which first defines the nature and the function of medical review
committees and then states:
A person who acts in good faith and within the scope of jurisdiction of a medi-
cal review committee is not civilly liable for any action as a member of the
medical review committee or for giving information to, or participating in, or
contributing to the function of the medical review committee.
MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-601(f) (1986) (emphasis added). See also OR. REV.
STAT. § 41.675(4) (1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.97 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
9. In response to the growing fear of potential antitrust suits, legislation has been
enacted which gives some degree of immunity from suit to members of peer review
committees. However, coverage differs from state to state, and each statute must be
scrutinized to determine which activities and which persons are covered. This grant of
immunity has made it impossible for the challenging physician to proceed past the
pleading stages in his suit. Most claims are simply demurred to or dismissed on a sum-
mary judgment motion. Interview with Peter A. Schneider, Bonne, Jones, Bridges,
Mueller & O'Keefe (March 27, 1987).
10. See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit reached a
similar result in Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
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in receiving quality health care outweighs the rights of physicians to
assert even legitimate antitrust claims.
The Patrick Case
Patrick v. Burget is one of the most recent examples of a judicial
determination in the area of antitrust and medical peer review.1 1 In
Patrick, an Oregon antitrust case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a 2.1 million dollar jury award12 that caused widespread fear
that participation in peer review committees may be a basis for po-
tentially burdensome liability.13
The court in Patrick was faced with allegations by a staff physician
that adverse peer review recommendations were motivated by the de-
sire to eliminate competition. Dr. Patrick alleged that his fellow staff
members' lack of cooperation, their appeals to the Board of Medical
Examiners, and their presence at hearings to revoke staff privileges,
all amounted to unfair attempts by competitors to create a
monopoly.14
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Oregon's mandatory medical peer re-
view committees15 are immune from federal antitrust scrutiny under
11. 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, (Oct. 5, 1987) (Docket No. 86.1145).
12. The jury awarded Dr. Patrick $650,000 for antitrust violations, which the court
then trebled. The jury also awarded $20,000 in compensatory and $90,000 in punitive
damages. The court awarded Dr. Patrick $228,600 in attorney's fees. Id. at 1505.
13. Rust, Justice Says Peer Review Not An Antitrust Violation, AM. MED. NEWS,
Dec. 19, 1986, at 2, col. 1. In response to a request by the American Medical Associa-
tion, the United States Department of Justice issued a letter making clear its position
with respect to peer review proceedings and antitrust laws. Hoping to alleviate the
"chilling effect" that high-profile antitrust suits have created across the country, the
Department stated the following:
Antitrust laws do not stand in the way of physicians' participation in hospital
peer review conducted to identify and restrain incompetence in the provision
of health care .... To the contrary, because such peer review enhances both
the quality and efficiency of services delivered in our nation's hospitals to the
benefit of consumers, it furthers the antitrust goal of fostering competition in
the health care marketplace.
Id.
14. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1502.
15. The Oregon statutory scheme provides:
The governing body of each health care facility shall be responsible for the
operation of the facility, the selection of the medical staff and the quality of
care rendered in the facility. The governing body shall:
(a) Insure that all health personnel for whom state licenses or registration
are required are currently licensed or registered;
(b) Insure that physicians admitted to practice in the facility are granted
privileges consistent with their individual training, experience and other qual-
ifications;
(c) Insure that procedures for granting, restricting, and terminating privi-
the "state action" doctrine.1s The court reasoned that the state had
ordered the activity in a clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed statute,17 and that the regulation of the process belongs to
the state alone-not the federal courts.18 The court further declared
that physicians who feel they have been wronged by the peer review
process may pursue their claims in state courts, but maintained that
federal antitrust laws should not apply in state court actions.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
To fully understand and appreciate the impact of Patrick v.
Burget,2o it is helpful to examine the structure of a typical hospital
medical staff and the functions of peer review committees. A review
of the hospital structure also reveals why hospitals must exercise dis-
cretion in selecting their medical staffs.2 '
A. Organization of the Medical Staff
A hospital's governing board has ultimate responsibility for main-
taining quality patient care.22 The medical staff, however, bears the
immediate responsibility to ensure that such care is actually adminis-
tered.23 To fulfill this obligation, the medical staff must establish and
perform certain functions for monitoring and improving its medical
leges exist and that such procedures are regularly reviewed to assure their
conformity to applicable law; and
(d) Insure that physicians admitted to practice in the facility are organized
into a medical staff in such a manner as to effectively review the professional
practices of the facility for the purposes of reducing the morbidity and mortal-
ity and for the improvement of patient care.
OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055(3) (1985).
16. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1507. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
17. See Oregon statute, supra note 15.
18. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1507.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1498.
21. The law has imposed upon health care facilities an increasing obligation to
properly select and continually monitor their attending physicians under the doctrine
of corporate liability. See Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 337-41, 183
Cal. Rptr. 156, 157-58 (1982); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). See also Southwick, The
Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship With
the Stqff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429 (1973); Walkup & Kelly, Hospital Liability:
Changing Patterns of Responsibility, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 247 (1973).
22. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MAN-
UAL FOR HOSPITALS 49 (1987) [hereinafter JCAH]. (In August, 1987, this Commission
changed its name to Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations.)
In Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974), the court
took judicial notice of the nationwide standards describing the organization and func-
tions of medical staffs and their committees in accredited hospitals. In a footnote, the
court recited the JCAH credentials and recognized its accreditation and standards as a
benchmark. Matchett, at 627 n.2, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 319 n.2.
23. JCAH at 109.
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practice.24 These functions include: surgical case review (tissue re-
view), review of pharmaceutic and therapeutic activities, review of
medical records, review of blood utilization, antibiotic usage reviews,
and other patient-related medical activities. 25 One other important
function is that of investigating the credentials of applicants for staff
privileges.26 In most hospitals with large medical staffs, these func-
tions are performed by committees composed of members of the
medical staff.27 Of all the committees that are regularly set up, the
"credentials committees" have routinely been targeted by antitrust
claims.
It is the responsibility of the credentials committee to collect and
review information on the professional competence and ethical prac-
tices of all applicants for medical staff privileges.28 The committee
makes recommendations to the staff's executive committee regarding
approval or denial of applicants' privileges.29 Although the governing
board is responsible for the final decision with regard to all recom-
mendations,30 the executive committee can still exercise considerable
influence over the extension of these privileges.31 This power to in-
fluence the ability of a physician to retain or obtain staff privileges
provides a basis for the allegation that peer review committees en-
gage in anticompetitive acts.
The credentials committee is also empowered to re-appraise all
staff members on a regular and periodic basis to approve or deny re-
appointment and to delineate the scope of a member's staff privi-
leges.32  The committee reviews information concerning the
professional performance, judgment, technical skill, and health of the
physicians on staff.33
Peer recommendation serves an important role in this evaluation
process.34 Significantly, the recognized purpose of peer review is the
continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients
through objective, candid, and sometimes brutally critical evaluation
24. Id. at 122.
25. Id. at 122-27.
26. Id. at 117-121.
27. Id. at 115.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 122.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 115.
32. Id. at 121.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 122.
of a physician's clinical practices.35
B. The Antitrust Considerations
1. Background
The Sherman Act,36 passed by the United States Congress in 1890,
was designed to prohibit restraint of trade37 and monopolization of
the marketplace.38 The aim of Congress in promulgating the Act was
to promote "full and free competition" in the marketplace.39 The
United States Supreme Court stated in 1958 that:
[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at
the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic, political and social institutions.
4 0
In pleading a cause of action under section 1 or 2 of the Sherman
Act, the plaintiff must adequately allege the jurisdictional require-
ments of interstate commerce. 41 The Seventh Circuit in Williams v.
St. Joseph Hospital,42 established that "medical practice per se and
without more is a local activity. '43 However, the Supreme Court has
since embarked on an expanded interpretation of the interstate com-
merce requirement as applied to the health care field.44 Thus, a com-
plaint is now deemed adequate if it alleges facts sufficient to establish
that the defendant's illegal conduct constitutes "interstate com-
merce" or has a "substantial adverse effect upon interstate com-
merce. ' 45 Under the "substantial effect" test, it has been held
unnecessary for a plaintiff to show that the impact on interstate com-
35. See Firestone, Malicious Deprivation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 14 LEGAL
ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC. 1 (May, 1986).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
37. Section one of the Act establishes: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id. § 1.
38. Section two of the Act establishes: "Every person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... Id. § 2.
39. See S. 3445 50th Cong. 2d Sess. § 1 (1888); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("[tjhe policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competi-
tion"). For an excellent treatment of the legislative history of the Act, see Letwin,
Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CM. L. REV. 221 (1956).
40. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4.
41. See infra notes 42 and accompanying text.
42. 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980).
43. Id. at 454 (citing Polhemus v. American Med. Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir.
1944)).
44. See Kissman, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges:
Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1982).
45. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1980); Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976) (hospital that received out-of-state sup-
plies and finances determined to be involved in interstate commerce).
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merce has caused a business collapse, affected market prices, or that
the defendant intended to affect interstate commerce. 46 In hospital
cases, some well-recognized methods for demonstrating effect upon
interstate commerce in antitrust litigation include: (1) treatment of
out-of-state patients; (2) receipt of medicare; (3) receipt of medicaid
and out-of-state insurance funds; and (4) purchase of medicine, equip-
ment, and medical supplies from out-of-state retailers by the defend-
ant hospital or physician or the plaintiff doctor. 4 7
2. Exemptions Under the Antitrust Laws
Over the years, courts have developed exemptions to the antitrust
laws which prevent any inquiry into a defendant's allegedly anticom-
petitive actions. Although the exemptions are not statutory, they
have nevertheless become well-defined through their evolution in
case law. Significant to the health care field are the state action doc-
trine,48 implied repeal,49 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.50
a. The State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine5i was first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Parker v. Brown.52 In Parker, the Court held that a Califor-
nia statute53 which established state control over raisin production
46. Hospital Bldg. Co., 425 U.S. at 745-46.
47. Id. at 744. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 824 n.63 (3d Cir. 1984)
(osteopath denied staff privileges); Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1984); Fur-
long v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2nd Cir. 1983); Mishler v. St.
Anthony's Hosp. Systems, 694 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1981) (neurosurgeon excluded from
emergency room referral list); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715
(10th Cir. 1981) (pathologist denied staff privileges); Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 438 (4th
Cir. 1980); Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (doctor denied
reappointment to hospital staff).
48. See infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982). This federal statute specifically exempts certain
activities from federal antitrust scrutiny if the following requirements are met: (1) the
practices challenged must involve the "business of insurance;" (2) the "business of in-
surance" must be regulated by state law; and (3) the conduct challenged must not in-
volve an agreement to boycott, coerce or intimidate. Id. § 1012, 1013(b). Because peer
review activities are not connected to the "business of insurance," the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act will not be discussed.
51. For an excellent review of the state action doctrine, see P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
LAW 206-20 (Supp. 1982); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafay-
ette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435 (1981).
52. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
53. California Agricultural Prorate Act, Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754. The constitu-
tionality of the Act was sustained by the California Supreme Court in Agricultural
Prorate Comm. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 2d 550, 55 P.2d 495 (1936).
was immune from antitrust scrutiny.54 This conclusion represents
the Court's attempt to resolve the conflict between principles of fed-
eralism and the antitrust laws' goal of preserving and encouraging
unfettered competition. 55 Relying on principles of sovereignty, the
Court stated:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nul-
lify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed
to Congress.
5 6
A recent Supreme Court case concluded: "Thus, when a state legisla-
ture adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of the state ... and
ipso facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws." 5 7
When the challenged activity is not undertaken directly by the leg-
islature or the state supreme court, but rather is carried out by
others pursuant to state authorization, closer analysis is required to
determine if the state action doctrine applies.5 8 It is imperative to
ensure that the anticompetitive conduct of the state's representative
was contemplated by the state.59
To acquire immunity in these cases, the Supreme Court has stated
two requirements for immunity to attach under Parker.60 First, the
challenged restraint must be a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy;61 second, the policy must be actively super-
54. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.
55. Id. at 350-51.
56. Id. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 51 at 207-08.
57. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984).
58. Id. See also New Motor Vehicles Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96
(1978) (state board's enforcement of a clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed state
regulation of automobile dealerships exempt under Parker); Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413-15 (1978) (plurality opinion) (city's operation of
electrical utility system exempt under Parker if state contemplated the action com-
plained of when it authorized the city to operate in the area); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (enforcement of clearly articulated disciplinary rules by
state supreme court acting in its legislative capacity is exempt under Parker); Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (plurality opinion) (private utility company's
regulation of light bulbs, approved by the state and required to be continued until a
new tariff was filed, not exempt under Parker); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975) (state bar association's enforcement of a minimum legal fee schedule
not exempt under Parker because it was not compelled by the state).
59. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568.
60. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97 (1980).
61. Id. at 105. To establish the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy" prong of the state action exemption, the state legislature must authorize
the challenged activity and must intend it to displace the federal antitrust laws. See P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW supra note 51 at 212; see also Community Communications
Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949
(6th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
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vised by the state.62
A peer review committee mandated by state law may fall within
the state action exemption. In Patrick, the court found that "by com-
pelling physicians to review their competitors affirmatively, [the
State of Oregon] has expressed a policy to replace pure competition
with some regulation." 63 The Patrick court also found that the peer
review process was actively supervised by the state. 64 Crucial to this
conclusion was the court's finding that supervision by the Board of
Medical Examiners, a state agency, was the equivalent to supervision
by the state.65 Therefore, it may be concluded that if a peer review
committee can establish that the state legislature contemplated that
the peer review statute was intended to replace competition with reg-
ulation in the relevant market, and that a state agency supervises the
peer review process, then the peer review activities are exempted
from antitrust challenge under the state action doctrine.
b. Implied Immunity
Conduct that is mandated by federal legislation is covered by an-
other exemption to the antitrust laws referred to as "implied immu-
nity" or "implied repeal." This exemption is grounded on the theory
that Congress intends an implied repeal of the antitrust laws when it
passes subsequent legislation which directly conflicts with those
laws.66 In order to reconcile the two statutory schemes, the antitrust
laws are considered repealed to the extent necessary to make the
subsequent legislation effective.6 7 However, implied immunity is not
viewed favorably and "can be justified only by a convincing showing
of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory
system." 68 The intent of Congress to repeal the antitrust laws must
62. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n., 445 U.S. at 105. In Patrick, the court
found that internal review by the hospital, the Board of Medical Examiners, and by
the courts constituted adequate supervision. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1506. See Hoover, 466
U.S. at 572 n.22 (availability of judicial review evidence of state action); Tambone v.
Memorial Hosp., 635 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (no state supervision where
record of peer review not automatically transmitted to state agencies).
63. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1505-06.
64. Id. at 1506.
65. Id.
66. National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378
(1981); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Gordon v.
New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
67. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
68. National Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 388; National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S.
at 719-20.
be clear and will most likely be found only when a regulatory agency
has been empowered to supervise, authorize, or require the particular
type of conduct under antitrust scrutiny.69
National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue
Cross70 was the Supreme Court's most recent consideration of im-
plied immunity. In that case, National Gerimedical Hospital at-
tempted to enter into a participating hospital agreement with Blue
Cross, a nonprofit provider of health care reimbursement plans. Blue
Cross refused to enter into the agreement on the basis that the hospi-
tal had failed to comply with the provisions of the National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (hereinafter
NHPRDA).7z National Gerimedical then filed an antitrust lawsuit
against Blue Cross, claiming that Blue Cross' refusal placed it at a
competitive disadvantage.7 2
The Supreme Court refused to find Blue Cross' acts exempted
under the implied immunity doctrine. 73 The Court noted that action
taken by Blue Cross was neither compelled nor approved by any gov-
ernment regulatory body.74 The Court also found no inconsistency
between the NHPRDA and the antitrust laws which would necessi-
tate a partial repeal of the antitrust laws to effectuate the Act.75
The activities of federally mandated hospital peer review under the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act 7 6 can be distinguished from
the activities challenged in National Gerimedical. Unlike the activi-
ties questioned in National Gerimedical, the federal peer review law
specifically mandates peer review activities. It may thus be argued
that to the extent Congress intended to encourage peer review activi-
ties, Congress must have intended a partial repeal of antitrust laws
that prohibit peer review. Therefore, those peer review activities re-
quired by federal law and supervised by the Department of Human
Services may be exempted from antitrust scrutiny under the implied
immunity doctrine.
69. National Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at 389.
70. Id. at 378.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1983 & Supp. III 1986). Blue Cross relied on the hospital's
failure to obtain approval for construction from the Mid-America Health Systems
Agency [hereinafter MAHSA]. MAHSA was the local "health system agency" under
the Act for health planning. The hospital did not seek approval of its construction be-
cause MAHSA had announced a policy that it would not approve any addition of acute
care beds.
72. National Gerimedical claimed violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act and violations of the Missouri antitrust laws. National Gerimedical, 452 U.S. at
382.
73. Id. at 393.
74. Id. at 389.
75. Id. at 393.
76. See infra notes 123-148.
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3. Peer Review Under the Antitrust Laws
Even though peer review activities may be exempted from anti-
trust implications, they are still subject to scrutiny as to whether an
illegal agreement among competitors is present. The Sherman Act
prohibits agreements "between competitors, actual or potential, deal-
ing in competing products in a relevant market."77 Once it is deter-
mined that there is an agreement between competitors, the
challenged agreement must be evaluated by either the per se rule or
the rule of reason.
a. The Per Se Rule
The per se rule is a judicially created rule under which certain
types of agreements are considered "so plainly anticompetitive that
no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegal-
ity."7 8 The per se rule has traditionally been applied to cases involv-
ing price-fixing, 79 group boycotts, 80 and tying arrangements8 l are
summarily treated because of their "pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue."8 2 A physician challenging com-
mittee actions faces difficult legal obstacles and very little favorable
precedent unless the physician is able to categorize the challenged ac-
tion as one of the traditional per se violations. Absent a finding of
per se violations, courts resort to the rule of reason standard which
almost invariably results in a ruling in favor of the health care
agency.8 3
The professional status of physicians and other health care provid-
ers may also be a basis for peer review committee members to escape
antitrust liability. Although the Supreme Court has disavowed any
total professional exemption from antitrust scrutiny,84 it has indi-
cated that antitrust laws might be applied less rigorously to profes-
77. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 169 F. Supp. 888, 893 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
78. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
79. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The per se analy-
sis will apply even if the agreement would stabilize maximum prices. See Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968); Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
80. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
81. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
82. Id. at 5.
83. See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
sions than to trades or industries.8 5
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,86 the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected an expansive professional exemption from antitrust scrutiny.
Goldfarb involved a minimum-fee schedule for legal services relating
to real estate transactions enforced by the Virginia State Bar.8 7 A
class action suit was brought, in which it was alleged that the mini-
mum-fee schedule constituted price-fixing in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.88
The County Bar relied on two arguments in defending the case.
First, it argued that Congress never intended to include the learned
professions within the terms of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 9 Sec-
ond, it maintained that competition was inconsistent with the prac-
tice of a profession because enhancement of profit is not the goal of
professional activities.90
The Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments, finding that
the nature of the occupation standing alone is insufficient to create
an exemption from the Sherman Act91 and that the public service as-
pects of a profession are not controlling.92 However, the Court did
not completely rule out the possibility that it may impose a less strin-
gent standard on professionals. In a footnote, the Court cautioned:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular re-
straint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice
of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automati-
cally to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other
areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may
require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. 9 3
In subsequent decisions, the Court has continued to mention this
more lenient standard for professionals but has refused to apply it.
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,94 the
Court was confronted with the legality of a canon of engineering eth-
ics prohibiting competitive bidding among engineers. 95 The Court in-
validated the canon because it completely precluded competitive
prices among engineers. 96 In its defense, the Society relied heavily
on Goldfarb, asserting that the canon sought to preserve traditional
85. Id.
86. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
87. Id. at 776.
88. Id. at 778.
89. Id. at 786.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 787.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 788-89 n.17.
94. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
95. Id. at 681.
96. Id. at 692-93.
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fees for services while at the same time preventing "public harm
which might be produced by unrestrained competitive bidding."97
The Court conceded that professional services may differ signifi-
cantly from other business services and ethical canons may serve to
regulate and promote competition.9 8 However, the Court found that
the engineers' ethical canon, which resulted in a total ban on compet-
itive bidding, was too broad and an improper reason for doing away
with competition. 99
The most recent decision announced by the Court dealing with the
application of the antitrust laws to a profession is Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Society.100 In Maricopa, the Court found maxi-
mum-fee agreements per se unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The Court stated that doctors who are parties to price-fixing
agreements will not be safeguarded from antitrust liability any more
than nonprofessionals.101 Referring to Goldfarb, the Court noted
that Maricopa was not a case where the agreements were premised
on public service or ethical norms which may have permitted applica-
tion of a less stringent standard.102 The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that the judiciary has too little experience with antitrust in the
health-care industry to apply a per se rule.103
The scope of the professional exemption is not yet clear. If the
United States Supreme Court grants review in Patrick, it will have
an excellent opportunity to address this principle outside a price-fix-
ing setting. Patrick, unlike Golkcfarb, National Society, and Mari-
copa, involves no allegations that would subject the parties to the
traditional per se analysis. Also, the hospital peer review process
contains elements of public service which the Court found lacking in
Maricopa. Additionally, peer review does not constitute a total ban
on competition, but merely regulates competition by encouraging
only competent physicians to practice medicine. Therefore, the pro-
fessional exemption may be found to attach in this setting. As a re-
sult, the reviewing court may apply a less stringent standard of
review, provided the court determines that the inherent goal of peer
review is to improve the quality of patient care.
97. Id. at 687.
98. Id. at 696.
99. Id.
100. 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (plurality opinion).
101. Id. at 349.
102. Id.
103. Id.
b. The Rule of Reason
The rule of reason is a common law doctrine which developed long
before the enactment of the Sherman Act.10 4 The legislative history
of the Act indicates that Congress intended that common law princi-
ples should assist the courts in shaping the scope of the Act's broad
proscriptions. 0 5 Thus, courts have consistently relied on the rule of
reason to provide a flexible means of delineating the scope of the
act.10 6
The rule of reason focuses directly on the impact of the challenged
restraint on competitive conditions. 10 7 However, "[c]ontrary to its
name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any ar-
gument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the
realm of reason." 10 8 In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States,10 9 the Court enunciated a two-pronged test to determine if the
challenged contracts "were unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions."110 Under the test, unreasonableness can be found either:
(1) based on the nature or character of the contracts; or (2) where
the surrounding circumstances give rise to the inference or presump-
tion that the contracts were intended to restrain trade or enhance
prices.1 1 The Court has adhered to the position that the inquiry
mandated by the rule of reason is whether the challenged agreement
is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition.1 12
Thus, in peer review cases, either an anticompetitive purpose or an
anticompetitive effect would have to be found in order for the rule of
reason to invalidate the denial or revocation of staff privileges.11 3
Anticompetitive purpose may be present where the peer review ac-
tion is conducted by fellow physicians who wish to be insulated from
additional competition. Suppression of competition might also be
104. The rule of reason developed from the case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng.
Rep. 347 (1711). Mitchel involved the enforceability of a covenant not to compete for a
limited time and within a limited area. The court upheld the covenant, finding that
the benefits of enhancing marketability outweighed the temporary loss of competition.
Id. at 350. Mitchel has been regarded as a standard for application of the rule of reason
to covenants in restraint of trade which are ancillary to a legitimate transaction. See
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1977).
105. National Soc'y of Professional Engrs, 435 U.S. at 688 n.11.
106. Id. at 688.
107. Id.
108. Id
109. 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
110. Id at 58.
111. Id.
112. The rule of reason was further explained by the Court in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) as follows: "Under this rule, the
factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."
113. Robinson v. McGovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 915 (1981).
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found where a physician is given a poor peer review evaluation be-
cause of failure to join a medical society. However, under the rule of
reason, the Court may look beyond this result and inquire whether
the action taken by the peer review body is one that promotes or sup-
presses competition.1 4
Therefore, peer review action may be found to actually promote
competition because effective review has the result of ensuring that
only qualified physicians are permitted to practice medicine, which in
turn results in increased competition among those physicians in prac-
tice. A court may also find that a hospital, acting through its peer re-
view body, has legitimate reasons for denying or revoking a privilege,
especially in light of new trends in hospital corporate liability.115
The application of the rule of reason to staff privilege revocation
cases allows hospitals to be selective in their obligation to maintain
control over the quality of its medical staff. If conducted properly, it
is unlikely that review activities will be found to violate the antitrust
laws under the rule of reason.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING INTERESTS
The primary goal of the peer review process is to assure that
health care is delivered in a competent manner. 116 Protection of the
public health, safety, and welfare is also of importance because the
general public is correctly deemed incapable of monitoring the sys-
tem themselves.117 At odds with these interests are those of a physi-
cian who has been subjected to a sham peer review evaluation
conducted by his competitors. 118 Analysis of the relative significance
of the rights being protected, however, reveals that these competing
interests are reconcilable.
The most significant interest protected is that of ensuring that the
public receives quality health care from a competent physician.119 To
facilitate this interest, "self-policing" is crucial because, in this au-
thor's opinion, nonprofessionals lack the capacity to judge the compe-
tency of a professional.120 The result is that any peer review
114. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
115. See Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
116. See Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 595 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
117. Franco v. District Ct., 641 P.2d 922, 925 (1982).
118. See Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1986), cert granted, 107
S. Ct. 1345 (1987).
19. Franco, 641 P.2d at 925.
20. Id.
125
committee member must contemplate that his or her fellow staff
members might conceivably complain or raise questions concerning
his or her own competency.121
Inevitably, physicians charged with the duty of initiating a com-
plaint will be personally acquainted with the staff member to be re-
viewed and will often be his competitor. 122  However, the
anticompetitive aspects of this process have been diluted because
physicians who conduct the review are faced with the knowledge that
what they include in their reports may be used against them in court.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
In an effort to show its concern for the problems facing physicians
called upon to recognize and root out incompetent practitioners, Con-
gress enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (the
Act).123 Effective November 14, 1986, the Act provides to peer review
committees 124 which act in good faith125 immunity from state126 and
federal 127 antitrust suits as well as other actions.128 The preamble of
the Act indicates that Congress recognized that the fear of private
121. Marrese, 748 F.2d at 388.
122. Id. See Miles & Philp, Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An Overview, 24
DuQ. L. REV. 489 (1985). See Springer & Casale, Hospitals and the Disruptive Health
Care Practitioners-Is the Inability to Work With Others Enough to Warrant Exclu-
sion?, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 377 (1985).
123. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 100 Stat. 3784, codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152. The
bill was introduced by Oregon Democratic Representative, Ron Wyden. For a compre-
hensive analysis of the Act, see Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 3 THE
HEALTH LAWYER Winter, 1987, at 2.
124. Peer review committees fall within the definition of a "professional review
body" defined in the statute as follows: "a health care entity and the governing body
or any committee or a health care entity which conducts professional review activity,
and includes any committee of the medical staff of such entity when assisting the gov-
erning body in a professional review activity." 42 U.S.C. § 11151(11).
125. Section 11112 of the Act enumerates the standards for professional review ac-
tions. Section 11112(a)(1) expressly states that in order to take advantage of the pro-
tections afforded by the Act, professional review must be grounded upon a "reasonable
belief that the action was in furtherance of quality health care." Id. § 11112(a)(1).
126. Immunity from state law actions applies only for professional review actions
taken on or after October 14, 1981. Id. § 11111(c)(1). States may by legislation elect to
opt into the Act at an earlier date as authorized by section 11111(c)(2)(A) or opt out of
the Act entirely pursuant to section 11111(c)(2)(B).
127. Immunity from federal claims applies to professional review activity com-
menced on or after November 14, 1986, the date the Act was enacted. Id. § 11111.
128. Expressly exempted from the Act are actions based on state or federal civil
rights actions. Id. § 11111(a)(1). Specifically exempted are the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Id. § 2000(e); and the Civil Rights Acts, Id. § 1981. Therefore, exclusion of a phy-
sician on racial or ethnic grounds could not be defended by asserting the immunity
provisions of the Act. Id. § 11111(a)(1).
Additionally, the provisions of the Act in no way limit the enforcement power of the
state and federal governments. The Act is meant to apply only to private damage
awards. This relief is further limited to liability for civil damages only. Defendants
are not protected from claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. § 11113(a).
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money damages under the federal laws, specifically, potential liability
for treble damages awards under the antitrust laws, had created a na-
tionwide chilling effect on peer review activities.129 Additionally,
Congress expressed doubt in the ability of the individual states to
remedy the national problem on their own.130
To promote peer review activities, Congress granted the immunity
to any professional review body, its staff members, anyone under
contract or other formal agreement with the body, or any person who
participates with or assists the review body.131 This protection is
granted only to a peer review action taken in a reasonable belief that
it was in furtherance of improving the quality of health care. 132
Under the Act, peer review bodies are presumed to have conducted
themselves in accordance with the Act unless the presumption is re-
butted by a preponderance of the evidence.133 If a suit is brought
against a committee member, and at the conclusion of the action the
committee member substantially prevails,134 the Act provides for re-
covery of costs of the suit by that party, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees if the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, without
foundation, or in bad faith.135
In return for the limited immunity conferred by the Act, various
entities will be subject to stringent reporting requirements. Insur-
ance companies are now required to report all malpractice judgments
129. Section 11101 provides as follows:
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to im-
prove the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that war-
rant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual
State.
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physi-
cians to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physi-
cian's previous damaging or incompetent performance.
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective profes-
sional peer review.
(4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, in-
cluding treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably dis-
courages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.
(5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protec-
tion for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
Id. § 11101.
130. Id.
131. Id § 11111(a)(1).
132. Id. § 11112(a).
133. Id.
134. If the plaintiff obtains an award for damages or for permanent or injunctive
relief, the defendant will not be considered to have substantially prevailed. Id. § 11113.
135. Id.
or settlements to the national bodyl36 and to the state licensing
boards 37 or risk payment of civil penalty fines of up to $10,000.138
Each state board of medical examiners will be required to report to
the national body and the state licensing board all competency-re-
lated license revocations, suspensions, censures, or reprimands, or
else risk losing the protection from antitrust suits.1 3 9 Finally, the
Act imposes an affirmative duty on hospitals, as opposed to other
health care entities, to request information from the Secretary that
has been reported.140 Hospitals must request the information when a
physician applies for membership on the medical staff. The hospital
is also required to obtain information once every two years on all
physicians who are currently members of its staff.141
For purposes of medical malpractice actions, if the hospital fails to
meet its duty to affirmatively obtain the information described above,
the hospital is presumed to have knowledge of any information that
has been reported to the Secretary.142 However, once the hospital
obtains the information in accordance with the Act, it cannot be held
liable for reliance on the information provided.143
The antitrust immunity provided by the Act appears much nar-
rower than the protection afforded in Patrick.144 In Patrick, the im-
munity was given to the peer review board although there was
evidence that the procedure was conducted in bad faith.145 In con-
136. The information must be reported at least monthly to the Secretary. The ini-
tial report must be submitted within one year of the date of the enactment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11134.
137. Id. § 11134(c).
138. Id. § 11131(c). In California, insurance companies must report any judgment
or settlement rendered against an insured physician for an amount of $30,000 or
greater. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 801(b) (West Supp. 1987). Section 11131 is much
less lenient and requires that all judgments or settlements be reported. Not less than
two years after the date of enactment, the Secretary will report to Congress on
whether reporting small claims should continue to be required. 42 U.S.C. § 11131(d).
This provision will have a substantial impact on settlement negotiations in medical
malpractice actions. Under present California law, an incompetent physician may ef-
fectively avoid being reported to the Board of Medical Quality Assurance if a settle-
ment can be reached wherein his insurance company will pay less than $30,000 under
the policy. The new provisions of the Act, however, will prevent an unfit physician
from settling any lawsuit without the appropriate state or federal agency becoming
aware of the circumstances surrounding the action.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 11132.
140. See Id. § 11134(a).
141. Id. § 11135. The obligation to request information applies not only to physi-
cians, for whom reporting is mandatory, but also to other health care practitioners for
whom reporting is discretionary. Id. § 11133. Reports by health care entities are first
directed to state boards of medical examiners who are then required to forward the
information to the Secretary. Id. § 11133(a)(1)(c).
142. Id. § 11135(b).
143. Id. § 11135(c). This protection is not extended, however, if the hospital has
knowledge that the information provided was false.
144. 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1345 (1987).
145. In Patrick, the court noted that there was "substantial evidence" that the peer
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trast, the Act provides immunity only to those actions conducted "in
a reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality
health care."146 This obligation of the federal statute is similar to the
"good faith" requirements of many state immunity statutes. 147
In summary, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act will likely
be viewed as both a blessing and a hazard to physicians and health
care entities across the nation.148 It is clear, however, that as long as
the requirements of the Act are complied with, the peer review com-
mittee can be confident that measures taken to increase the quality
of patient care will not subject them to a federal antitrust lawsuit.
V. CONCLUSION
Peer review serves a vital societal function. There is no question
that it should be afforded utmost protection. At stake is the public
interest in receiving quality health care by competent practitioners.
This goal can be achieved most effectively if physicians responsible
for reviewing the competency of their colleagues are given absolute
assurance that, in so doing, they will not become subject to a high-
profile antitrust lawsuit.
JOAN M. RUANE
review proceedings were conducted in bad faith. However, the court stated that the
issue of "bad faith" is generally a question for the state courts. Patrick v. Burget, 800
F.2d 1498, 1507 (9th Cir. 1986).
146. See supra note i35 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
148. The Act states that information obtained by the Secretary is considered confi-
dential. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1). The exceptions to the rule provide that with respect
to medical malpractice actions, or professional review actions, the information will not
be considered confidential. Id. However, just how much information a medical mal-
practice plaintiff will be able to obtain is uncertain at this time. This provision could
be a very powerful tool for litigants wishing to establish that the hospital knew or
should have known about an incompetent physician employed on its staff. Id
§ 11137(b)(1).

